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 Abstract 
Modern democratic governance occurs only rarely via traditional Weberian hierarchies or 
pure ‘markets’.  Rather, public policies are made via some kind of hybrid arrangement 
involving a range of different actors, including some representing private or non-
governmental institutions.  The concept of policy networks - clusters of actors, each with an 
interest, or ‘stake’ in a given policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success 
or failure - has been developed and refined as a way to try to describe, explain and predict 
the outcomes of policy-making via such hybrid arrangements. Governance by policy network 
is rife at the level of the European Union because it is such a highly differentiated polity 
which is dominated (in important ways) by experts and highly dependent on ‘government by 
committee’.  Research on EU policy networks has produced useful results but we remain 
some distance away from an agreed, plausible ‘theory’ of policy networks. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Modernes demokratisches Regieren geschieht selten über traditionelle Webersche 
Hierarchien oder reine “Märkte”. Stattdessen werden politische Entscheidungen über eine Art 
hybrides Arrangement einer Anzahl von unterschiedlichen Akteuren getroffen, von denen 
einige private oder öffentliche Institutionen repräsentieren. Das Konzept von 
Politiknetzwerken – Cluster von Akteuren, die jeweils ein Interesse an einem bestimmten 
Politikfeld und die Fähigkeit besitzen, politischen Erfolg oder Mißerfolg mitzubestimmen – 
wurde als eine Methode entwickelt und verfeinert, die versucht, die Ergebnisse von 
politischen Entscheidungsprozessen über solche hybriden Arrangements zu beschreiben, zu 
erklären und vorauszusehen. Regieren über Politiknetzwerke ist auf der europäischen 
Ebene so weit verbreitet, weil es auf bedeutende Weise von Experten dominiert wird und 
stark abhängig von dem “Regieren durch Ausschüsse” ist. Die Erforschung von 
Politiknetzwerken hat nützliche Resultate geliefert, doch wir bleiben noch etwas von einer 
einmütigen, plausiblen “Theorie” von Politiknetzwerken entfernt. 
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1. Introduction1 
Modern democratic governance – imposing overall direction or control on the allocation of 
valued resources – often bears little resemblance to traditional Weberian notions of hierarchy 
or neoconservative ideas of delivering public services through private markets. Instead, 
public policies are made and delivered via some kind of hybrid arrangement involving a 
range of different actors, including some representing private or non-governmental 
institutions. Public policies, by definition, are the responsibility of public authorities and aim to 
satisfy some vision of the ‘public good’. Yet, modern governance, not least in the European 
Union (EU), reflects a shift ‘towards a sharing of tasks and responsibilities; towards doing 
things together instead of doing them alone’ (Kooiman 1993: 1; see also Rhodes 1997; 
Thompson et al. 1991; Peters 1996).  
The term ‘network’ is frequently used to describe clusters of different kinds of actor who are 
linked together in political, social or economic life. Networks may be loosely structured but 
still capable of spreading information or engaging in collective action. Academic work on 
networks is often vague or abstract, or both (see Peterson and O'Toole Jr. 2001). But 
growing interest in network forms of governance reflects how modern society, culture and 
economy are all increasingly products of relations involving mutuality and interdependence, 
as opposed to hierarchy and independence. Linkages between organizations, rather than 
organizations themselves, have become the central analytical focus for many social 
scientists.  
The term policy network connotes ‘a cluster of actors, each of which has an interest, or 
“stake” in a given…policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure’ 
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 8). Analysts of modern governance frequently seek to explain 
policy outcomes by investigating how networks, which facilitate bargaining between 
stakeholders over policy design and detail, are structured in a particular sector. Three 
features of European Union (EU) governance give sustenance to policy network analysis.  
First, the EU is an extraordinarily ‘differentiated polity’ (Rhodes 1997). Decision rules and 
dominant actors vary significantly between policy sectors, such as regional development or 
external trade policy. Battles for policy ‘turf’ are frequent and fierce, as are attempts to build 
high firewalls around policies in a given sector so that they cannot be altered or undone by 
actors from other sectors. One consequence is that EU policy networks tend to be discrete, 
distinct, and largely disconnected from one another, even when they preside over policies 
that are clearly connected, such as agriculture and environmental protection. Most have 
diverse memberships, extending to public and private, political and administrative, and 
                                                 
1 The article is forthcoming in: Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds), European Integration Theory, Oxford 
University Press (2003).  
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‘European’ and national (and often international and sub-national) actors, and lack clear 
hierarchies. But the general picture is one of great diversity. The extension of the EU’s 
competence to new areas, such as monetary and defence policy, has been accompanied by 
the creation of new, more diverse and anomalous policy structures. Policy network analysis 
helps us to describe the EU despite its ‘polycentricity’, or tendency to generate ever more 
and more dissimilar centres of decision-making and control (Peterson and Bomberg 2000).  
Second, EU policy-making resembles supranational policy-making in other international 
organisations (IOs), such as the World Trade Organization or International Monetary Fund, in 
that much of it is highly technical. In these and other IOs, experts who share specialized 
knowledge and causal understandings tend to identify and ‘bond’ with each other, and often 
seek to depoliticise the policy process. In the EU, as in other IOs, technical expertise ‘can 
become an exclusionary device, a device that is more effective at the supranational level 
because representative institutions like parliaments, that can play a surveillance role by 
holding experts accountable, are weak’ (Coleman 2001: 97; see also Radaelli 1999).  
Third, EU policy-making is underpinned by an extraordinarily complex labyrinthe of 
committees that shape policy options before policies are ‘set’ by overtly political decision-
makers such as the college of Commissioners, Council of Ministers, or European Parliament 
(EP). The Union relies heavily on ostensibly apolitical committees of officials, experts and 
other stakeholders to surmount dissent, broker agreement, and move the policy agenda 
forward. EU policy formulation and implementation are usually scrutinised closely and 
repeatedly by national officials, via Council working groups and the arcane ‘comitology’ 
system, with committees at different levels performing different functions and having different 
but overlapping memberships. Two inevitable questions arise: first, whether and how much 
agents representing the EU’s supranational institutions are empowered by their roles as 
brokers of intergovernmental agreements; and, second, whether and how often 
‘representatives of civil society such as consumers’ organizations or agricultural producers’ 
interest groups who might have access to, or even participate in, domestic policy networks 
might be frozen out at the supranational [EU] level’ (Coleman 2001: 97). In any event, it is 
clear that EU policies are significantly shaped and closely scrutinised by different kinds of 
officials and experts in the EU’s committee system, both before and after ultimate policy 
decisions are taken by overtly ‘political’ actors.  
There exists no agreed ‘theory’ of policy networks that would lead us to predictive claims 
about European integration or EU policy-making. Yet, most analyses of the EU which employ 
the policy network as a metaphor seek to test the basic proposition that the way in which 
networks are structured in any EU policy sector will determine, and thus help explain and 
predict, policy outcomes. Nearly all contend that policy outcomes often cannot be explained 
by exclusive recourse to the mediation of national preferences. In order truly to theorise 
policy network analysis, more (and more thorough) case studies of the actual policy effects 
of governance by policy network are needed, along with a larger dose of normative thinking 
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about how to design networks that are efficient and legitimate, particularly as the EU 
encroaches on progressively more and more diverse national policies (Scharpf 1999; 2002).  
1.1 Policy Networks and EU Governance 
Policy network analysis starts with three basic assumptions. First (again), modern 
governance is frequently non-hierarchical. Few policy solutions are simply imposed by public 
authorities. Governance involves mutuality and interdependence between public and non-
public actors, as well as between different kinds of public actor, not least in federal or quasi-
federal polities such as the EU.  
Second, the policy process must be disaggregated to be understood because ‘relationships 
between groups and government vary between policy areas’ (Rhodes 1997: 32). In other 
words, it makes little sense to talk generally of a ‘strong state’ or ‘corporatist state’ – let alone 
a ‘strong’ or weak’ international organisation (IO) – because states and IOs are much 
stronger vis-à-vis affected interests in some policy sectors than in others.  
Third and finally, governments remain ultimately responsible for governance, but that is not 
the whole story. Before policies are ‘set’ by elected political actors, policy choices are shaped 
and refined in bargaining between a diverse range of actors, including some who are non-
governmental, all of whom have an interest in what policy is chosen. Policy networks can 
narrow options and shift the agenda by pursuing ‘strategies that generate new political and 
economic forces’ (Thatcher 1998: 406). Sometimes, they can go so far as to ‘play a role in 
the determination of their own environment, with repercussions for the fit between political 
interests, organizational structures and economic objectives’ (Thatcher 1998: 406; see also 
Dunn and Perl 1994; Peterson 1995b). To cite a specific example, the materialization of an 
EU social policy regime can be explained in part as the product of collective action on the 
part of an emergent social policy network to create a more favourable environment for EU 
intervention (see Falkner 1999). 
Arguably, policy network analysis is never more powerful an analytical tool than when it is 
deployed at the EU level. The Union is a unique polity, with no government or opposition, 
and powerful policy-makers who are non-elected, such as European Commissioners or 
members of COREPER. Its policy remit extends to highly technical matters of regulation, 
including new technologies, thus making the politics of expertise a crucial determinant of 
outcomes. With its own system of law and the capacity to impose its will on a polity of around 
370 million citizens (soon to be 470 million), the EU may seem enormously powerful. Yet, it is 
extraordinarily weak in terms of resources, and relies heavily on private sector assets and 
expertise. The effect is to blur the distinction between public and private that is at the heart of 
traditional notions ‘public policy’. To try to describe how the EU works without the metaphor 
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of a network is a challenge on par with seeking to explain, under the same injunction, how 
international terrorists operate (see Biersteker 2002). 2  
That said, the policy networks literature can be hard going. It features a variety of models 
and, confusingly, sometimes employs the same term to mean different things. For example, 
the ‘Rhodes model’ of policy networks (see below) employs the term ‘policy community’ to 
mean a particularly tightly integrated and single-minded policy network (see Rhodes 1997; 
1990; Marsh 1998; Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Yet, elsewhere policy community is used to 
refer to the broader universe of ‘actors and potential actors who share a common identity or 
interest’ in a certain policy sector (Wright 1988: 606). Sometimes, works from different sub-
disciplines seem like islands in a stream. Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) masterful study of 
‘advocacy networks’ of activists in international politics sometimes uses terminology that is 
incongruous with the ‘advocacy coalition’ framework developed in the public policy literature 
by Sabatier (1998; Sabatier and Jenkins -Smith 1993). Legal theorising about network forms 
of governance can seem impenetrable (see Ladeur 1997). 
The Rhodes model of policy networks has probably been employed more often than any 
other in the study of EU governance (see Peterson 1995a; Daugbjerg 1999; Peterson and 
Bomberg 1999; Bomberg 1998; Falkner 1999; 2000). Simply put, the model assumes that 
three key variables determine what type of policy network exists in a specific sector: 
1) the relative stability of a network’s membership: do the same actors tend to dominate 
decision-making over time or is membership fluid and dependent on the specific policy 
issue under discussion?  
2) the network’s relative insularity: is it a cabal which excludes outsiders or is it highly 
permeable by a variety of actors with different objectives?  
3) the strength of resource dependencies : do network members depend heavily on each 
other for valued resources such as money, expertise and legitimacy or are most actors 
self-sufficient and thus relatively independent of one another?  
A continuum emerges with tightly integrated policy communities on one end, which are 
capable of single-minded collective action, and loosely-affiliated issue networks on the other, 
which find it far more difficult to mobilise collectively. The internal structure of policy networks 
                                                 
2 The latter task seems impossible. Take, for example, the following policy prescription: ‘Among the most 
effective strategies of defence against a global terrorist network is the development of a networked response. 
Transnational networks need to be mobilized, global civil society needs to be engaged and private sector 
financial institutions need to be employed to suppress or freeze the financial assets of terrorist networks’ 
(Biersteker 2002: 83). Or, consider an expert’s view of progress in the ‘war on terrorism’: ‘Now you’re into a 
situation where there is a network of networks…With al-Qaeda, if you take out nodal points in the network, they 
will regrow’ (quoted in Financial Times, 9–10 November 2002: 8). 
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is usually considered an independent variable, in that the structure of a policy network will 
help determine policy outcomes. For example, policy communities have more capacity than 
issue networks to steer or control the policy agenda. 
Policy network analysis is increasingly used to make sense of internationalised policy-
making environments such as the EU. A primary aim is often to determine what interests – 
national or supranational – dominate bargaining within transnational networks (see Coleman 
and Perl 1999). The answer is usually revealed by considering two questions. First, does the 
policy sector in question give rise to much public sector activism? In other words, to what 
extent are politicians and senior public officials directly active and involved, and determined 
to impose their wills? Second, how much autonomy do supranational institutions have in any 
given sector? In the EU’s case, are the Commission, EP and Court endowed with their ‘own 
resources’ in terms of Treaty powers or funding, or are they largely dependent on national 
and private actors?  
One of the strengths of the Rhodes model is that, despite occasional discrepancies in 
terminology, most other models of governance by network are compatible with it. Take, for 
example, the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ developed by Peter Haas (1992: 3) as a 
way to describe how policy-making can become dominated by ‘network[s] of professionals 
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain’, particularly ones subject 
to internationalised policy-making. Or, consider Sabatier’s (1993: 25) advocacy coalition 
framework, which holds that policy shifts usually occur when the sectoral agenda is seized 
by overtly political networks consisting of various kinds of policy activist, including public 
officials representing multiple levels of government, who ‘share a particular belief system’ 
and work together over relatively long periods of time (10 years or more) to force policy 
change. If EU governance is conceived as occurring within a multi-level system in which 
policies emerge after a fairly standard sequence of different types of decision, it is plausible 
to see EU governance at the sub-systemic level (in space) and policy-shaping stage (in time) 
as largely a competition between epistemic communities and/or advocacy coalitions 
(sometimes by competing versions of them) to steer or control policy networks, with which 
their own memberships overlap, in specific sectors. Sometimes, epistemic communities and 
advocacy coalitions may form alliances, particularly to shift the policy agenda in the direction 
of radical policy change as occurred, for example, when the EU embraced quite radical 
liberalisation of its agricultural sector during the Uruguay Round which gave birth to the WTO 
in the early 1990s (see Ullrich 2002).  
More generally, policy network analysis can help us explain why EU policy outcomes in a 
particular sector reflect purely technocratic rationality or, alternatively, the overtly political 
agenda of key actors (Peterson 1995b: 79-80; see also Peters 1998: 29–30). For example, 
the Framework programme for funding collaborative research has quietly expanded to 
become the third largest item of expenditure in the Community’s budget, not least because 
much decision-making about precisely who gets what from the programme has been 
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delegated to epistemic communities of researchers and scientists (Peterson and Sharp 
1998: 163–87). Alternatively, highly politicised environmental policy debates over auto 
emissions, packaging waste, or biotechnology can be viewed as battles between competing 
advocacy coalitions – broadly advocating environmental protection vs. industrial interests – 
for influence within EU environmental policy networks.3  
Moreover, policy network analysis often works ‘best’ when deployed together with other 
theoretical accounts of EU politics or policy-making, for two reasons. First, its explicit task of 
explaining sub-systemic policy-shaping means that it is compatible with intergovernmentalist 
or neofunctionalist accounts of decision-making at the highest political levels, where ‘history-
making’ decisions are taken which determine how the EU changes or evolves as a polity. 
Moreover, policy network analysis often can explain actual policy outcomes that are hard to 
explain using either of these theoretical accounts (which, after all, are not really theories of 
policy-making). Policy network analysis is also congruent with most institutionalist treatments 
of the EU, 4 particularly ones which focus on ultimate policy choices, for which authority is 
very much shared by the EU’s institutions (Peterson and Shackleton 2002: 361–3). 
Second, policy network analysis adds value to alternative, meta-theoretical conceptions of 
EU governance. For example, the idea that informal, sector-dedicated, mostly self-organised 
policy networks are responsible for a large portion of EU governance is obviously amenable 
to the broader notion that the Union produces a kind of ‘network governance’, in which 
‘political actors consider problem-solving the essence of politics and…the setting of policy-
making is defined by the existence of highly organised social sub-systems’ (Eising and 
Kohler-Koch 1999: 5). Its compatibility with a theoretical portrait of the EU as a system in 
which actors must constantly seek to ‘escape from gridlock’ is obvious:  
…the decisional processes are obstacle-ridden, cumbersome and, to say the least prone to 
stalemate. This in turn gives rise to attempts to use escape routes by those actors who 
constitute nodes in the multiplicity of criss-crossing interactions, with subterfuge being the 
only way to keep policy-making going (Héritier 1999: 97). 
Policy network analysis also has affinities with constructivist accounts that highlight the ability 
of international organizations (IOs) such as the EU to generate new categories of actor and 
                                                 
3 Thatcher’s (1998) contrast between policy network analysis and what he calls ‘policy learning models’, such as 
epistemic communities and advocacy coalitions, and his claim that ‘policy network frameworks cannot simply 
be mixed with other approaches’ are two of the less convincing points made in his otherwise thoughtful critique 
of policy network analysis. If we compare different approaches and concepts such as policy network, issue 
network, policy domaine, etc. we find that ‘the fundamental principle underlying all these approaches is that 
relations between actors, rather than the actors’ individual attributes, hold the key to explaining public policy 
decisions’ (Knoke 1998).  
4 By some accounts, policy network analysis is actually a variant of institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Lowndes 1996; Peters 1999). 
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norms. Increasingly, IOs have rational and legal authority to make rules; none moreso than 
the EU.  As they make rules, IOs define international tasks (preventing the spread of AIDS in 
Africa), create new categories of actor (‘political refugees’), and generate new norms 
(minority rights). They thus generate new social knowledge that can alter the interests of 
actors in policy-making that occurs at a level beyond the state (see Barnett and Finnemore 
1999; Christiansen et al. 2001. For instance, EU governments have gradually come to 
identify their own self-interest in the prevention of ‘social exclusion’, with the EU hastening a 
shift in policy priorities in this direction and, particularly, the Commission ‘sponsoring’ a new 
social exclusion lobby (see Bauer 2002; Atkinson 2002). This example seems to vindicate 
assumptions that are central to the portrayal of the EU as a system of ‘multi-level 
governance’ (see section 2 below): that is, the Commission retains ‘virtually a free hand in 
creating new networks’ (Marks et al. 1996: 359) and is often empowered by its position at the 
‘hub of numerous highly specialized policy networks’ (Marks et al. 1996: 355).  
1.2 The Origins of Policy Network Analysis 
In broad terms, the application of policy network analysis to the EU is a product of the 
widely-shared view that the European Union is not an ordinary, ‘garden variety’ IO, but rather 
a system of governance in its own right. As such, leading theories of European integration  
can tell us little about the EU’s processes for making policy (see section 1.3 below). Having 
emerged as the source of a large ‘slice’ of the total universe of all public policies in Europe, it 
is natural that tools developed by analysts of public policy at the national level are 
increasingly deployed at the EU level.  
The precise origins of policy network analysis in the public policy literature are a matter of 
dispute. Richardson (2000: 1006) claims ‘British origins of what is now termed the network 
approach’. Rhodes (1990: 32) concurs that ‘American political science was not the major 
formative influence’ on early work which sought to make sense of the British ‘post-
parliamentary’ state using network analysis in the late 1970s. Yet, an eclectic range of early 
work in the UK, US and Europe on interest intermediation – via both corporatist and pluralist 
structures and focused on intergovernmental (that is, local-national) and government-
industry relations – attempted to develop the idea of networks as an analytical concept. An 
important example is Heclo’s (1978) spirited critique of the idea that the American policy 
process was subject to dynastic rule by ‘iron triangles’ of mutually supportive legislators, 
bureaucrats, and private actors. On the contrary, Heclo (1978: 102) argued, the policy 
process was influenced by a diverse collection of stakeholders grouped into ‘issue networks’ 
– that is, complex networks focused on specific issues – which extended far beyond those 
actors with the formal power to set policy: ‘Looking for the few who are powerful, we tend to 
overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of power’. 
Jordan (1981; Jordan and Schubert 1992) can claim credit for developing the idea that issue 
networks were one variant of network – and a rather extreme one – which existed on a 
8 — John Peterson / ‘Policy Networks’ — I H S 
continuum ranging from very loose to very tightly integrated. The common denominator of 
early work on networks, which pre-dated the EU’s emergence as a true polity, was an 
ambition to explain how and why interests were mediated in settings that resembled neither 
open ‘markets’ of transactions between independent entities nor hierarchies in which 
governments – or any other actor – imposed control.  
To make a long story short, international political developments in the decade or more after 
1990 – globalisation, devolution (in Europe and elsewhere), and economic liberalisation –
gave rise to new and different forms of governance, in which power was increasingly shared 
horizontally. Policy network approaches became both more common in the policy literature 
and progressively more ambitious. No longer were its advocates content to present policy 
networks as mere metaphors. New attempts were made to try to theorise about them, and 
describe, explain and predict policy outcomes by examining exchanges within policy 
networks (Peterson 1995b; Bomberg 1998; Daugbjerg 1999; Falkner 2000; Nunan 1999; 
Andersen and Eliassen 2001). The results were decidedly mixed, with some observers 
finding a widening gap between aims and achievements (see Le Galès and Thatcher 1995; 
Thatcher 1998). 5  
1.3 The Importance of Policy Networks for Integration 
To understand the basic hypotheses and arguments endemic to this approach, it must be 
acknowledged that policy network analysis does not constitute a theory of political or 
economic integration, in Europe or anywhere else. In fact, scholars began to investigate the 
EU using policy network analysis in the early 1990s precisely because the time-honoured 
debate between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, although revived in interesting 
new permutations (see Moravcsik 1991; Burley and Mattli 1993; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991), 
shed relatively little light on actual EU policy, and the complex systems that emerged for 
making it (Rosamond 2000: 105–13). Both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism were 
and remain macro-level theories of international relations, which are designed to describe, 
explain and predict the broad thrust and path of European integration as a process. Neither 
are intended to describe, explain or predict the policy outcomes that arise from this process, 
as policy network analysis often seeks to do. 
Even proponents of policy network analysis would be hard-pressed to identify the central 
features – main assumptions, causal propositions, core predictions – of a ‘network theory’ of 
policy-making. Nonetheless, network analyses usually focus on one or more of three basic 
arguments: 
                                                 
5 Dissent about the utility or analytical power of policy network analysis is summarised and evaluated in section 
2.1 below. 
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How policy networks are structured in discrete EU policy sectors has tangible, measurable 
effects on policy outcomes.  
Put another way, EU policy outcomes are determined by how integrated and exclusive 
policy-specific networks are, and how mutually dependent actors are within them. We should 
expect different kinds of outcome in sectors, such as pharmaceuticals or agriculture, where 
tightly-integrated, cabalistic policy communities are guardians of the agenda, than in sectors 
populated by loosely bound issue networks, such as environmental policy. One testable 
(although still to be proven) hypothesis is that more integrated networks will tend to block 
radical change in EU policies, while outcomes are far harder to predict when pre-legislative 
bargaining occurs within issue networks. More generally, policy networks are an independent 
or ‘intervening’ variable: ‘analyses look at the ways in which network structures affect the 
selected aspects of the behaviour of actors and their interactions – for instance in the spread 
of information, strategies of actors, exchanges amongst them and policy outcomes’ 
(Thatcher 1998: 410).  
Quasi-federal polities such as the EU naturally give rise to governance by policy network. 
Federalism is, by nature, a method for reconciling competing values: strong yet small 
government, minimum ‘federal’ standards alongside local discretion, and private sector 
autonomy with the provision of public goods. These values cannot be reconciled either 
through strict hierarchies or pure ‘market’ structures. Rather, they must be reconciled through 
negotiation and the exchange of resources and ideas. Logically, structured but informal 
policy networks arise to facilitate this kind of negotiation, particularly in today’s federal 
systems (including the EU), most of which have moved away from ‘dual federalism’, with 
ostensibly separate jurisdictions between levels of government, and towards ‘cooperative 
federalism’, in which interdependence between levels of government is accepted and even 
welcomed (see Peterson and O'Toole Jr. 2001). 
Governance by policy network gives rise to management and legitimacy concerns, 
particularly in the EU.  
Despite claims to the contrary (see Moravcsik 2002), it is commonly held that the EU suffers 
from both management and legitimacy deficits. The management deficit arises from the lack 
of incentives for any actor in non-hierarchical networks to invest in management capacities 
(Metcalfe 2000). The legitimacy deficit results from a lack of clear rules of process, 
transparency or judicial review to govern informal bargaining within EU networks (see 
Dehousse 2002). Moreover, the technical discourse of supranational policy-making is an 
important reason why networks of government officials and experts are usually subject to 
less scrutiny than at the national level. In fact, the empowerment of national actors by virtue 
of their participation in EU policy-making, which is generally not subject to close political 
control, may well enhance their authority at the national level and empower them in 
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bargaining that takes place within domestic networks (Ansell and Weber 1999; Coleman 
2001).  
The ‘news’ that the EU governs largely by policy network is not, by any means, all bad. 
Informal bargaining within networks can help build consensus in a system which strives to 
avoid creating clear ‘losers’. Policy networks can diffuse norms of good governance, 
particularly to states – such as those in Central and Eastern Europe – whose civil services 
are still maturing. They can also help to ensure that private actors have a sense of 
‘ownership’ of EU policies. Nevertheless, the salience of the EU’s management and 
legitimacy deficits points to the need for normative thinking about how EU policy networks 
should be structured, managed, and subjected to oversight and control. Complex 
interdependence between national and EU policy-making means that a lot of EU governance 
is always going to rely on exchanges within policy networks. Thus, it makes sense to design 
networks that can manage effectively and are part of the solution to the EU’s legitimacy 
problem.  
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2. Evaluating Policy Network Analysis 
While the EU’s future, especially in advance of radical enlargement, is very much unwritten 
(see Weiler 2002), there is no denying that it is a uniquely successful experiment in 
transnational governance. Eventually, it could emerge as: 
a source of institutional innovation that may yield some answers to the crisis of the nation-
state. This is because, around the process of the formation of the European Union, new 
forms of governance, and new institutions of government, are being created, at the 
European, national, regional and lo 
cal levels, inducing a new form of state that I propose to call the network state6 (Castells 
1998: 311; see also Howse and Nicolaïdis 2002). 
Upon close examination, the ‘network state’ turns out to be a rather frustrating concept. Its 
‘actual content…and the actors involved in it, are still unclear, and will be so for some time’ 
(Castells 1998: 311). What is clear is that EU governanc e occurs simultaneously at multiple 
levels of government, thus giving rise to ‘multi-level governance’ (MLG) as a descriptive term 
for what the EU offers. In theory, and at least sometimes in practice, power is distributed 
between the EU, national, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity: 
that is, the Union as a whole legislates only in areas (such as air pollution or external trade 
policy) where policy problems cannot be solved at lower levels of government. To portray the 
EU as a multi-level system of governance is to assume that actors representing different 
levels of government are interdependent. They thus ‘network’ with each other to design, 
implement and enforce EU rules.  
Yet, MLG is clearly far more prominent in some policy sectors - above all, cohesion policy - 
than others, such as competition policy (although even here it could be argued that the EU is 
shifting towards more network-type governance). MLG was probably less of a general model 
of EU governance at the end of the 1990s than many would have predicted at the beginning 
of the decade, when a ‘Europe of the regions’ seemed within reach as European integration 
and regional devolution accelerated simultaneously (Marks 1992; Marks et al. 1996). 
Indicative, perhaps, is Castells’ (1998: 331) emphasis on the importance of the EU’s 
Committee of the Regions (CoR) as the ‘most direct institutional expression’ of subsidiarity, 
despite general consensus 10 years after the CoR’s creation that it had ‘earned itself an 
uneviable reputation for being possibly the Union’s most pointless institution’ (Coss 2002).  
                                                 
6 Emphasis in original. The astounding breadth of Castells’ scholarship sometimes exposes a lack of depth of 
knowledge about the EU (a frequent problem for those who study the subject ‘part time’). For example, Castells 
(1998: 314, 317) repeatedly claims that qualified majority voting was extended in the late 1980s in the 
‘European Council’, rather than in the Council of Ministers. 
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Actual theory-building about governance via ‘vertical networks’ which link actors representing 
different levels of government has been rare. In fact, it might be argued that very little 
progress has been made since Keohane and Hoffmann (1991: 13) observed that the EU was 
evolving into a polity in its own right, ‘organised as a network that involves the pooling and 
sharing of sovereignty rather than a transfer of sovereignty to a higher level’. About all we 
can safely conclude from existing research is that most EU policy networks seem to be more 
horizontal than vertical in structure: most are linked to national networks of policy 
stakeholders (which are considerably embedded in them), but are mainly Brussels-centred 
and dominated by actors representing national governments and the EU’s institutions (see 
section 4 below), with sub-national actors rarely in positions of much power. EU policy 
networks are an important purveyor of multi-level governance, but it is difficult to view them 
as facilitating the dawn of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. 
2.1 Critique 
Policy network analysis has not been short of critics (Kassim 1993; Peters 1998; Dowding 
1995; 2001; Le Galès and Thatcher 1995; Thatcher 1998). It tends to be criticised on four 
specific grounds: 
– ‘Policy network’ may be a useful metaphor, but it does not constitute a model or theory.  
König’s (1998: 387) complaint is illustrative: 
a growing number of studies use the network concept as a metaphor describing the 
complexity of social and political life, but they have neither explained why private and public 
actors are mutually dependent, whether their dependency is restricted to the boundaries of 
specific subsystems and how this dependency affects public decision-making, nor generated 
testable hypotheses regarding the causal importance of policy networks for public decision-
making. 
Many proponents of policy network analysis would accept these criticisms. Most would 
concede that theorising about policy networks remains at an early stage. Nevertheless, 
theory -building must always start by building on metaphors which abstract from reality, and 
then point the analyst towards variables that may determine outcomes. Ultimately, policy 
network analysis may not answer many important questions about EU governance. 
However, it often points the analyst to where the answers may be found: the subterranean 
netherworld of officials, lobbyists and experts, a world often quite distant from the political 
world of ministers and parliamentarians. 
– Policy-making in Brussels is too fluid, uncertain, and over-populated with an 
enormously diverse collection of interests for stable networks to exist or persist. 
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According to this view, ‘EU governance is…best described as uncertain agendas, shifting 
networks and complex coalitions’ (Richardson 2000: 1021). This set of circumstances is 
considered to be bad news for proponents of policy network analysis because:  
the utility of network typologies is open to question in situations in which there is rapid 
change (both of institutions and actors), a lack of clear sectoral/subsectoral boundaries, 
complexity of decision-making and a potentially large number of actors drawn from different 
levels of policy formation, as claimed, for instance, to exist in European policy-making 
(Thatcher 1998: 398). 
Proponents of this view sometimes go as far as to question whether stable networks exist at 
all in Brussels. Actors may form alliances and work together on specific issues – thus the 
term ‘issue network’ – but most actors are promiscuous. Thus, once formed, networks 
quickly disintegrate. It is not surprising, given such fluidity, that ‘case studies of EU policy-
making tend to examine individual decisions rather than whole sectors or sub-sectors’ 
(Kassim 1993: 21). 
This criticism lacks credibility, for at least three reasons. First, stability of membership is a 
variable, not an assumption, of the policy network approach. The EU, more than most 
systems of governance, may give rise to loosely-integrated and fluid issue networks more 
often than stable policy communities. But the matter is one for empirical investigation. 
Moreover, it is possible to find policy episodes – such as the 1989 directive on automobile 
emissions (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 190–1) – when an insecurely structured issue 
network managed to overcome its own fluidity and capture the policy agenda long enough to 
produce an outcome that would not have been predicted by pluralist or incrementalist 
theories. In any event, as the EU matures it is possible – perhaps likely – that ‘more stable 
and manageable networks of policy-makers are likely to emerge’ (Mazey and Richardson 
1993: 4). The maze of EU committees, whose members outnumber the total number of 
officials in the Council and Commission combined by about three to one (Van Schendelen 
1998: 6), is meant – perhaps above all – to provide stability to policy-making.  
Second, the claim that the EU’s fluidity cannot be ‘captured’ by policy network analysis is 
usually made on the basis of very little evidence. Kassim’s (1993) ‘sceptical view’ of policy 
networks is based almost exclusively on evidence from the air transport sector, which is far 
more ‘nationalised’ and ‘globalised’ than most other European industries (and thus not very 
‘Europeanised’). Richardson’s (2000) dismissal of policy network analysis as overused and 
inappropriate at the EU level relies mainly on secondary sources on national lobbying 
strategies and EU external trade policy. 
Third and finally, relatively loosely-constituted networks are, somewhat ironically, often more 
effective channels of communication than tightly-integrated policy communities. The so-
called ‘strength of weak ties’ argument (Granovetter 1973) holds that: 
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In a world of cliques of tightly knit social circles, individuals are better off investing time in 
acquaintances (or ‘weak ties’) because it is through acquaintances that cliques are bridged 
and that information diffuses through a policy network…information communicated by strong 
ties – within-clique communication – will tend to be redundant, and will tend to travel short 
distances relative to the size of the network as a whole (Carpenter et al. 1998: 418–-9; see 
also Granovetter 1973). 
It may be that communication is more important as a lubricant to the policy process in the EU 
than in most other systems of governance. Consensus is ingrained as a norm and a vast 
number and diversity of policy stakeholders must typically agree before an EU policy may be 
‘set’. Timing is particularly crucial in EU policy-making: the losers in policy debates (despite 
attempts to avoid creating any) are frequently those who are unaware of when a dossier is 
‘ripe’ and ready for a decision, and are caught out because they lack adequate 
communication channels. 
– Policy network analysis lacks a theory of ‘power’.  
This criticism is a serious one, but it neglects the interstitial nature of policy network analysis: 
that is, the power of classical EU actors – particularly member governments – is not denied 
but it is not viewed as wholly determinant of EU outcomes.7 Network analysis looks for 
explanations in exchanges that cover over the cracks or crevices that separate different 
levels in a system of MLG, or different sets of institutional actors in systems where multiple 
institutions wield a slice of power. It contends that the EU system produces outcomes that 
cannot be explained exclusively by recourse to the mediation of national preferences, as is 
sometimes claimed (see Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994). Policy network analysis is 
‘pitched’ at a meso or sub-systemic level of decision-making, and thus is entirely compatible 
with macro-theories of politics, such as pluralism, elitism, and Marxism (see Daugbjerg and 
Marsh 1998). In the EU’s case, more or less power is concentrated at the sub-systemic level 
depending on which EU policy sector is under scrutiny: for example, a considerable amount 
of power for determining the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is delegated to the sub-
systemic level, while relatively little power resides at this level in relation to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Thus, policy network analysis is likely to tell us more 
about how the CAP is determined than how the CFSP is made (see section 2.2. below).  
Consensus has become widespread that policy network analysis should be deployed within 
a portfolio of theories pitched at explaining outcomes at different levels of governance (see 
Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Wallace 2000; Andersen and Eliassen 2001; Peterson 2001; 
Bomberg and Stubb 2003). Interestingly, the plausibility of intergovernmentalist theories of 
power in EU governance is frequently conceded in such schema, as only one kind of actor – 
                                                 
7 I thank Renaud Dehousse for making this point to me. 
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national actors – are powerful at every level in what has clearly evolved into a multi-level 
system of governance. However, most proponents of policy network analysis reject as 
artificial and false the dichotomy between ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘supranational 
governance’, since virtually ‘no administrative [EU] action can be developed without national 
administrative authorities being associated with it’ (Azoulay 2002: 128).  
– The literature on policy networks is often vague and caught up with insular, and purely 
academic debates about terminology.  
Sometimes, debates in the public policy literature between advocates of competing models – 
and especially between network ‘theorists’ and their detractors – seem increasingly 
unproductive. They often focus on rather trivial questions of terminology, and can be 
embarrassingly self-absorbed (Rhodes 1997; Richardson 2000; Marsh and Smith 2000; 
2001; Dowding 2001).8 Still, few serious students of European integration would deny that 
governance by networks is an essential feature of the EU. In fact, governance by network 
may be becoming a steadily more important feature of the EU, as evidenced by recent 
initiatives including (inter alia) the use of interest groups or NGOs in the implementation of 
environmental or development policies, the Commission’s (2001) emphasis on dialogue with 
civil society in its White Paper on Governance, and the increasing ubiquity of the so-called 
‘Open Method of Coordination’ of national policies through exchanges between purpose-built 
EU level networks of national officials (see Hodson and Maher 2001; Mosher and Trubek 
2003). 
2.2 Application: Policy Network Analysis and the CAP 
Any survey of recent literature on EU governance will uncover a variety of analyses using 
policy network analysis as an investigative lens. Cohesion policy (Ansell et al. 1997; Ward 
and Williams 1997; Bache 1998; Bomberg and Peterson 1998) and research policy 
(Peterson 1991; Peterson and Sharp 1998) are two of the most frequent targets of 
investigation via this method, not least because they are bastions, respectively, of policy-
making by linked clusters of national, sub-national and supranational actors and unusually 
technocratic procedures. However, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has probably been 
the focus of policy network analysis as much as any other EU policy sector (see Daugbjerg 
1999; Smith 1990; Coleman 2001; Ullrich 2002), for at least three reasons. 
                                                 
8 As much as the authors cited here may be diligently seeking to advance or critique policy network analysis, 
their frequent resort to self-citation and tendencies to try to rewrite their and other authors’ places in the 
literature mean that a diligent postgraduate student could be forgiven for concluding that recent debates seem 
to have become so petty and personal that the approach itself is best avoided. 
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First, CAP decision-making is shared between networks of product-specialised officials ( ‘the 
beef people’, ‘the cereals people’, etc.) responsible for managing specific markets on a day-
to-day basis, and the Agriculture Council, which is one of the busiest and most insular of all 
versions of the Council of Ministers. The Commission and Council Secretariat together act as 
institutional nodes that facilitate communication and exchange within a broader CAP policy 
network. This network’s autonomy and guardianship of the policy agenda – within the broad 
political framework set by the European Council and multi-year EU budget – are jealously 
guarded. The EU’s agricultural policy network is a true policy community. 
Second, although the CAP is one of the EU’s only truly ‘common’ policies, in the sense that it 
effectively replaces national policies, it is in fact highly decentralised with considerable 
discretion held by national agricultural ministries and ministers (see Grant 1997). Arguably, 
the CAP is considerably less ‘common’ today than it was when the problem of surplus 
production reached outright crisis proportions in the early 1980s, and powerful networks of 
experts were given autonomy to manage the crisis. More generally, as a case, the CAP 
seems to lend credence to the general hypothesis that as the focus of policy activity 
becomes more international, a supranational network dominated by experts can be 
expected, in most cases, to emerge. Over time, however, most policy networks become 
more subject to domination by national actors and intergovernmental bargaining, even if they 
are configured horizontally and sometimes enjoy considerable autonomy from their national 
political masters (Coleman 2001). 
Third, the CAP is a favorite whipping boy of Eurosceptics, who cite its wastefulness, 
regressiveness, and easy exploitation by transnational networks of criminals, including the 
Italian mafia and Irish Republican Army (Galeotti 2001: 213). In reality, of course, the main 
problem is a classic ‘pooled sovereignty, divided accountability’ problem (Peterson 1997): 
national administrations, not EU institutions, are mainly responsible for spending controls 
and the policing of fraud. A well-publicised CAP scam in the UK in summer 2002 saw 
Edward Leigh, the fiercely Eurosceptic chair of the relevant parliamentary committee, slam 
the British national system for spending CAP funding, and its responsible ministry, as 
‘appallingly lax’.9 The wider point is that regardless of the reputed virtues of governance by 
policy network, the CAP is emblematic of the management and legitimacy deficits to which 
this form of governance can give rise.  
                                                 
9 Quoted in Financial Times , 22 August 2002, p.4. 
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3. Policy Network Analysis and Enlargement 
The uncertainty facing a radically enlarged EU of 25 or more member states is vast. The 
immediate future of European integration is perhaps hazier now than it ever has been 
before. As such, it suffices to make just three points about how policy network analysis might 
help us to shed light on the EU after its next enlargement, and the ones subsequent to it. 
First, the EU-25 that should arrive by 2004 is likely to be fundamentally different from the old 
EU-15. But a number of patterns are so well-established that they will persist far into future. 
One is that all new member states take time to adjust to the EU’s unique brand of deciding 
by subterfuge, or ‘escaping from deadlock’ (see Heritier 1999); that is, essentially ignoring or 
subverting the formal rules and advancing the policy agenda through bargaining within 
informal policy networks. As such, formal accession to the EU does not make new Member 
States full, ‘equal’ members of the European Union (see Peterson and Jones 1999). Rather, 
new officials, and private and non-governmental actors from new Member States must learn 
the rules of the game that apply to policy-specific networks, and get used to bargaining 
within them. 
Second, there is no question that the states lined up to join in 2004 or afterwards have far 
less mature, proficient or professional civil services compared to the EU norm. Most are 
relatively inexperienced participants in international organizations, and many have never 
encountered a western-style lobbying system. A central issue is thus whether policy 
networks within an enlarged EU will be able to perform the function of disseminating norms 
of compliance with EU rules, despite vast disparities in levels of economic modernisation 
(and thus economic interests) and public sector leverage in the face of private sector power.  
Third and finally, it is going to become far more difficult to reform the EU of the future. The 
2004 intergovernmental conference (IGC) was considered by many member governments as 
Europe’s last shot at embracing truly meaningful reform of the Union’s institutions, before an 
EU-25 emerged with far too many veto players to make it possible to change anything very 
important.10 Olsen (2002: 593–4), one of the most clever of all students of institutional 
change, offers a final word on networks and enlargement: 
In the European Union governance takes place in polycentric, multilevel policy networks of 
public and private actors…Reformers are not omnipotent. There is no single sovereign 
centre with the authority and power to change fundamentally the policy order while many 
factors other than reformers’ choices influence change. Furthermore, reform capabilities  
                                                 
10 Arguably, the decision in 2002 to give the (then) 10 applicant states closest to membership full right of 
participation in the 2004 IGC meant that there were already too many veto players to make meaningful reform 
likely. 
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often have to be developed as an inherent part of the reform process, a key issue in many 
applicant countries…Comprehensive reforms tend to be highly divisive and European 
reformers face enduring differences that cannot be hidden behind apolitical rhetoric. 
4. Challenges and Prospects of Policy Network 
Analysis 
4.1 The Contribution of Policy Network Analysis 
The impact of policy network analysis on European integration theory has been significant. 
Yet, for the most part its significance arises from the way in which it has given theorists a 
language to describe and perhaps sometimes to explain – more rarely to predict – what 
European integration has wrought in terms of a governance system. The EU has, over time, 
become more eclectic as a polity as its policy competence has expanded, and more 
‘polycentric’ (Peterson and Bomberg 2000). For example, contrast the new, highly 
centralised system for monetary policy with the new, highly decentralised system of 
regulating food safety or medicinal products via new European agencies (McNamara 2002; 
Majone 2002). Then, consider the notion that states may develop a distinct ‘policy style’ 
(Richardson 1982), depending on how proactive or reactive, and how consensual or 
autocratic policy-making is. One important rationale for studying the EU using policy network 
analysis is that it is futile to try to characterise its policy-making process as reflecting one 
policy style when it incorporates so many different ones across its full range of policies. The 
policy network perspective reveals a repertoire of adaptable network systems at the EU level 
rather than a single pattern.  
To take the point further, it might be argued that there is great variety between EU policy 
networks for good reason: because a very diverse set of arrangements are needed for the 
EU to surmount different obstacles to cooperation in different areas of policy. Of course, 
governance by policy network is not without its pathologies, particularly the problem of 
networks being ‘captured’ and transformed into insular policy communities, dominated by 
vested interests and lacking transparency. But policy network analysis can help us explain 
both continuity in EU policy outcomes, and the Union’s (occasional, at least) capacity for 
policy innovation. 
It also can be argued that policy network analysis of the EU has ‘grown up’ considerably in 
recent years. Gradually, in the wake of the earliest applications of the policy network concept 
to EU governance (most of which were concerned with MLG), it has become clear that the 
policy networks that matter most in EU decision-making are more horizontal in structure – 
that is, dominated by actors representing the core EU institutions, representatives of EU 
member states, and powerful, Brussels-based lobbyists – as much or more than they are 
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‘vertical’, or knitting together mutually dependent actors representing multiple levels of 
governance. To be clear, EU policy networks are invariably linked to national networks in the 
same sectors. But the extent to which the former ‘stand apart’ from control by national 
capitals may be taken as another sign of the coming of age of the European Union as a 
polity in its own right. 
The main contribution of EU policy network analysis to theorizing about European integration 
is its emphasis on the Union’s inescapable diversity and complexity. A dizzying array of 
different kinds of actor can claim to be a policy stakeholder in a continent-sized polity of 370 
million people, which incorporates a rich variety of national systems of interest 
representation. Transnational networks of the kind that preside over the policy agenda in the 
EU and other international organizations are usually seen generally to be looser and less 
tightly integrated than their counterparts at the national level. But the more single-minded 
amongst them clearly can exploit the ‘space’ between the EU and its member states in 
pursuit of their own interests (see Josselin and Wallace 2001).  
4.2 The Future Development of Policy Network Analysis 
The future of policy network analysis is dependent to a considerable extent on its relative 
success in performing three functions.  
Can it effectively describe, explain and even predict outcomes arising from the use of new 
EU policy methods and modes? 
In recent years, a number of new alternatives to the traditional ‘Community method’ of 
legislating have emerged, including the Open Method (Hodson and Maher 2001; Atkinson 
2002), ‘co-regulation’ by private actors acting voluntarily with public regulators, and rule-
making by new European regulatory agencies (see Majone 2002; Dehousse 1997). Most 
involve less EU legislation per se or less stringent or detailed legislation, and depend more 
on coordination between national officials and ministries. A crucial question for future 
researchers is precisely what sort of interaction and overlap, with what effects, occur 
between domestic policy networks at the national level and Brussels-based EU networks (for 
an exception, see Nunan 1999). 
Can policy network analysis generate clearer and more rigorous hypotheses about what 
constitutes ‘success’ for different kinds of network?  
Long-established policy communities for whom EU policy brings benefits, and traditionally 
has done, might be considered successful when they are able to veto policy change. 
Alternatively, more recently established or emerging networks might measure their success 
by the extent to which they are able to force new issues onto the EU policy agenda. In any 
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event, we need clearer theoretical propositions about what sort of interests are empowered 
by which type of policy network structures, and which find themselves disadvantaged by 
certain types of network, and why. 
Is it possible to develop normative propositions about how EU policy networks can be 
structured and managed in order to serve the greater European good? 
Thus far, most policy network analyses have generated thick description of the EU policy 
process, while eschewing normative propositions or prescriptions. Especially in a radically 
enlarged EU, future research could usefully develop overtly normative analyses of how 
policy networks can be constructed to help solve problems of compliance (Haas 1999), 
management, (Metcalfe 2000), and legitimacy (Peterson and O'Toole Jr. 2001). 
Conclusion 
We have reviewed the (disputed) origins of policy network analysis as a tool for studying the 
policy consequences of European integration. The most basic assumptions of policy network 
analysis – including the basic assumption that network structure partially determines 
outcomes – have been examined critically, along with its main arguments. More generally, 
we have reviewed the main criticisms of a model that has never been short of critics, and 
found much to criticise. In particular, far more work needs to be done before policy network 
analysis can be considered truly to be a ‘theory’, as opposed to a mere metaphor.  
It may seem somewhat facile and predictable to conclude by calling for more theoretical 
development and empirical research. Yet, it is worth reminding ourselves of something quite 
remarkable about the study of the EU: how little we know about the internal workings of the 
EU (as well as most other IOs), as opposed to European integration as a broad political 
process. As Barnett and Finnemore (1999) argue, the theoretical lenses used to understand 
international cooperation between states tend to be rigidly economistic, and focused on 
assessing supply and demand for cooperation. Cooperation is, of course, an anomaly in an 
international world that is still viewed as anarchic by most international relations scholars. 
‘Consequently, our research tends to focus on the bargains states strike to make or reshape 
IOs. Scholars pay very little attention to what goes on subsequently in their day-to-day 
operations or even the larger effects they have on the world’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 
726). If nothing else, the rise of policy network analysis represents a sincere effort to 
understand how the EU works, day-by-day, and with what effects on the wider world. 
Arguably, policy network analysts are the least preachy of all types of scholar concerned with 
European integration because they are most willing to admit that there is much about the EU 
that we still do not understand very well.  
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